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Summary of Major Events and Problems 
Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office 
Office of the Chief of Ordnance 
Department of the Army 
1 January - 30 June 1953 
This is a digital version of a portion of a report. As the 
name indicates the Intelligence, Security, and Safety Office 
(IS&S) had diverse responsibilities within the Office of the 
Chief of Ordnance (OCO). That report is in the National 
Archives, Record Group 156: "Records of the Office of the 
Chief of Ordnance ... Histories of Staff and Operating Offices 
and Divisions of the Chief of Ordnance, 1946-1954, IS&S 
Office, July 195 thru June 1953," Box C 8. 
This is a digital version of the sections of the document 
concerning the Technical Intelligence Branch within the 
IS&S. Those pages were copied by Robert Bolin at the 
National Archives in the early 1990s. 
Personal Note: I was interested in Army Technical 
Intelligence and not in other activities of the Ordnance Corps. 
Other material about the history of the Ordnance Corps is 
available at the National Archives. - Bob Bolin 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
The mission of the 15&5 Office from 1 Janu~ 1953 through 30 June 1953 
remained unchanged (Current functional sheet attached as Appendix A, Incl. 1). 
Facilities 
The facilit,ies available to 18&8 Office were, in general, adequate. 
However during the summer months the office space assigned to the Technical 
Intelligence Branch on the fourth floor of the Pentagon Annex No.2 is 
inadequate. This office space is direct~ under a flat, tarred roof and 
the temperature and humidity frequently reached a point where it is 
unbearable. Therefore personnel in the Technical Intelligence Branch had to 
be released during such periods of unbearable heat and humidity. JA project 
was initiated to air condition this office space, the equipment was procured, 
but funds for installation of the equipment were not available. The 
equipment has been in st,orage since October 1952. The inadequacy of this 
facility creates a health hazard, an unnecessary loss of manhours, retards 
production of intelligence and the accomplishment of this branchls assigned 
mission. The cost involved in the installation of air-conditioning would be 
compensated for, by the full efficiency of the personnel working in this 
facility without loss of manhours for which they are compensated unnecessari~ 
due to a situation be.yond the control of this office. 
Activities 
The Executive Administration Office continued to function normal~ 
during the period, such as procurement of personnel, discussions on 1955 
budget es·liimates, and general office administration, etc. 
Personnel 
On 1 Januar.y 1953 an authorized strength of 58 civilians and 14 
officers was allocated to this office, reflecting an increase ofl 
civilian. and 5 officers. The bulk of the officer spaces were provided the 
Provost Harsha]. Branch to complete that staff' in order to carry out the' 
Provost Harshal functions and mission charged to the Chief of Ordnance. 
The increase of 1 civilian has not relieved the inadequac.y reported durLig 
the previous reporting period. 
II T.ECHNICAL INT~LICENCE 
Background 
The mission of the Technical Intelligence Branch might be summed 
up briefly as that of procuring, collatinG, evaluating, producing, and 
disseminating intelligen ce concerning Cl.ll foreign ordncn ce capabilities. 
This function is required of all Technical Services under the Army 
Intelligence Program. 
The ancestor of the Technical Intelligence Bl-'anch W2S the IvIilitary 
Intelligence Section of the Research and Engineering Division, which 
1-Jas afforded little opportunity to fulfill this mission 'lrJhen it was 
founded back in the late 1930 t s. A minor storehouse of reports, most 
of which were obsolescent and of little ordnc'Dce value, the unit 
suffered from a shor tage of channels of information and an almost 
complete absence of direct liaison with these channels. Following the 
establishment of separate intelligence organizations for each technical 
servi ce in August 1940" the Ordnan ce Nili tary Intelligen ce Section vIas 
enlarged and was assigned the mission of collating, digesting, and 
disseminating Ordnance intelligence derived from Nilitary Attache 
1/ 
reports.- In June 1942 the unit "HaS raised in status to the Technica1 
Intelligence Branch to coordinate its activities vlith the nevlly created 
Ordnance Intelligence Teams; the unit continued to expand 1-Jithout any 
major change in organiz2.tion until the close of 1'.[orld vJar II. 
Technical Intelligence L~anch was reduced to a section; its production 
unit was decreased from thirty-three employees to seven, its collection 
and dissemination unit to one employee -- notwithstanding the fact 
that some 2,500 Ordnance intelligence reports continued to flow into 
the unit each month. The section operated during the inmlediate post-
war years in what might be termed a shadowland of Ordnance intelligence. 
The unit somehow m2.naged to pass along ini'onl1ation of foreign 
developments to interested offices, but it was impossible for the 
handful of employees to collate and evaluate the mounting storehouse 
of raw intelligence into basic and staff intelligence. The commencement 
of the National Intelligence Survey Program in 1948 placed the Ordnance 
Corps in the embarrassing position of being unable to furnish its segment 
of intelligence, as required of all technical services. On the eve of 
the Korean operation, the section was supplying about 10% of the material 
requested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2. Bet'V18en 10,000 and 
15,000 foreign and domestic reports were stored without adequate index 
cards, so that the section was two to three months behira in filling 
requests for these reports.31 
The advent of hos tilities in Korea found the Ordnance Corps unable 
to evaluate the enenyt s materiel or its ordnance capacity_ On 18 July 
1950 Ordnance Corps Order Number 27-50 was issued to make a long ovel--o.ue 
correction of a bad situation and to preclude the reoccurrence of this 
31 See letter to Civilian Executive Officer, OCO, from Chief, Technical 
Intelligence Section, in Ord. Tech. Int. Branch files. 
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state of affairs. Again elevated to branch status, the Intelligence 
Branch (since renamed the Technical Int.elligence Bran ch) was placed 
along ~lith the Security and Safety Branches in the newly created 
IS&S Office. Its enlarged Collection and Dissemination Section 
immediately corrnnenced the operation of cataloging and abstracting 
the tremendoud 'backlog of old intelligence and the ever mounting 
number of new repo rts. The section 1-IaS char ged under the new 
organization 'With procuring and distributing all availa.ble technical 
intelligence reports pertinent to the Ordnance corps; maintaining a 
library of the se reports, and an appropriate locating system; conducting 
liaison with G-2 and other intelligence offices' in the \'lashington area 
and arranging for the mutual exchange of intelligence information; and 
numerous other co ordina ting functions. An exan pIe of the s cope of the 
unit t S operations can be gleaned from the fact that by the end of 1952 
approximately 50,000 documents had been circulated and distributed and 
some 1,500 individual requests for reports on Ordnance information had 
been satisfied. 
The branchts Technical Intelligence Section (since rene'lued the 
Nateriel Section) was assigned the task of collecting, maintaining, 
producing, and dissenlinating technical intelligence concerning the 
capabilities, performance, design, and development of foreign ordnance 
materiel. The section was also charged with the r esponsibili ty of 
providing technical guidance for Ordnance Technical Intelligence reams 
and preparing technical aids required for the maximum exploitation and 
use of ordnance materiel. Additional duties 
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Intel Subcomrni ttoo materiel 
GA~loitation program, and maintenance of inventory records for the 
colla tion of requirements, receipt, and disposition of all captured 
foreign materiel needed by the Ordnm ce Corps for intelligence and test 
purposes. The Nateriel Section is augmented by the branch 1 s Ordnance 
Technical Intelligence Office, located at .Aberdeen Proving Ground.Y 
By the end of 1952, the two units had issued 28 works on Soviet ordnance 
rnatel'iel. The se included II firing tables for mortars and field, 
antiaircra.ft, and co mba t vehicle artillery j 4 users t guides for ma.chine 
guns and mortars; 8 pamphlets dealing with anununition markings, 
ammunition interchangeability, and weapons field stripping; 4 training 
charts on rifles, machine guns, 8.nd antitank rifles; and a catalog of 
all known typ::; s of Soviet cunmunition. 
The branchls Strategic Section (since l'en~ned the Logistics 
Section) was established in order to furnish the Ordn2nce segment of 
intelligen ce required of all technical services under the l~rmy 
Intelligence Program. In addition to producing intelligence specifically 
reQuested by the Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, under this program, the 
section was also ch2,rged with the r esponsibili ty of compiling country 
studies of evaluated intelligence on foreign ordnance holdings; supply 
and storage, maintenance, manufact.uring facilities, research and 
development, and all factors that would affect Ordnance opera tions 
a.broad. The need for such a service had been foreseen by the Chief of 
11 See Appendix B, Inclosure 1 
Intelligence Branch. 
Organization ChcTt, Technical 
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· 4/ Ordnance lonb before the commencement of Korean operations-, but budget 
limitat.ions had precluded its establishment until mid-1950. By tho end 
of 1952 the Logistics Section had compiled IS ordn~ce countr,y studies, 
of which the more important were published and distributed to Department 
of Defense offices roncerned. The others were retained in draft fonn 
in the section file s for future us e in Ordna.YJ. ce ope ration planning and 
plan execution. In fulfillment of the Army Intelligence ProgI'arn, the 
Logistics Section had produced 11 NIS contributions and numerous 
reports, 0-2 Intelligence RevieH articles, and special studies. 
1 January - 30 June 1953 
The first six months of the year 1953 constituted a period in 
which operations continued generally unchanged, except for revisions 
instituted to perfect office techniques, and improve unit services. 
The COlle ction and Dissanination Section compiled an SOP covering all 
phases of the section 1 s opsrations. Four months Vlore required to 
complete the manual, wrJ.ch is 349 pa.ges in length. This work, together 
with an up-to-date functj,onal chart, has greatly simplified vlork 
procedures, has standardized or:erations wherever pos sible and has afforded 
the section 1 s personnel ready access to the dctDils of everyday procedure 
and office poliqr. During this .period the section received, cataloged, 
abstracted, and circulated within the Ordnance Corps over 12,000 reports) 
J:/ 8ee letter from Chi'3f of Ordnance to Intelligence Division, dtd 
8 September 19~.8, in Ord. Int. Branch files. 
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'Were routed to the production soctionso! the 
.branch. The unit also processed almost 500 requests' for information 
from offices outside of the branch, and performed numorous functions 
necessary for the efficient or;eration of an intelligence collection 
and dissemination facility. 
The Nateriel Section, in conjunction with the Ordnance Technical 
Intelli[;ence Office at Aberdeen Proving Ground) continued the production 
of technical publications in addition to it s other duties. During this 
period, Volume X of Section I (USSR) of the DepartmerrG of An~y pamplet 
on Foreign lVIilitary ~'!eapons 11a3 produced. Other publications included 
the Soviet Fuze Hanual; the Soviet Projectile Identification Guide; 
COmplete Hound Data for Soviet Arr:munition, Bombs, Grenades, and Rockets; 
a..l1d contributions to the Frankford Arsenal :tvremorandum on Hetallurgical 
Examination of Soviet C2rtI'idge Gases, the vJa tertm'ln Laboratory B.eports 
on l'letallurgical Examination on Soviet Production, and the G-2 
Intelligence I?eview. A special text on Soviet rifles and carbines 'Has 
receiving final editing at the Aberdeen OTIO at the end of June. A 
compilation of items of captured m2teI'iel needed by the Ordnance Corps 
for intelligence and test purpos es· 1rJaS completed" and the first lis t 
·was published and distributed on 1 July·195-;3. This project will be 
continued in order to keep field colle etion agencies informed of current 
requirements; a second list is scheduled to be published and distributed 
early in October 1953. 
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Tho LogisticD Sectlon, during thin pe.r1odJ fOl"'wnrded 'to tho 
office tHO 1'118 contributions on Conununist China, and one each for 
BulE;aria, Burma, Nationalist China, Iraq, and Poland. NIS contributions 
on six other countries were being prepared at the end of June. The 
section also reviewed drafts for the Ordnance portion of Series A 
Handbooks on France, Turkey, and Yugoslavia; submitted two feature 
article s to the G-2 Intelligence Review; wrote spe cial reports as 
requested by G-2; briefed and debriefed Nilitary Attaches and l'1.li.A.G 
personnel; and compiled an SOP for the Logistics Section. An ordnance 
country study on Portugal was published and dissern.inated during the 
first half of the year and a similar work on the Netherlands Has in the 
hands of the printer at the close of the period. At the end of June, 
country studies were being readied for publication on NorvJay, Italy, 
and the Communist. Zone of Germany. A study on the United Kingdom was 
awaiting final review, pending the receipt of information requested 
from the Nilitary Attache; country studies were also being prepared on 
Communist China and Bulgaria. 
Unsolved Branch Pro ble.ms 
The outstanding Cl..t.'1d apparently unsurmountable obstacle th1Varting 
liE ximum efficienCiJ continues to be the shortage of p;:;rsonnel a t various 
levels. In spite of every effort by the supervisory staff to streamline 
procedures and eliminate extraneous operations, the continuation of the 
rigid perso nnel ceiling had hindered the implementation of several basic 
C· n~v: Pl F ~·,rn l\' 'j U;.I "<" ,-•• ' .•• , ,I.-
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only slightly-lesa cSBontul.. Supervisors and Intelligence <ape 
are .frequently compelled to type their reports and to perform other 
incidential duties because of the shortage of typists and clerks. 
The Collection and Dissemination Section is unable to prepare 
an inventor.y of all file cases and to properly retire obsolete files 
to the Archives. The section has also been unable to keep its locator 
system reasonably current. 
'lne Nateriel Section, f'8ced with the task of covering all foreign 
Ordnan ce materiel -vu th a staff of only five Research S],:€ cialists, has 
concentrated on equipment of the USSH. The coverage of ordnance materiel 
of other countries -- Satellite, friendly, and neutral -- has suffered 
accordingly. A partial solution to this problem, but hardly a 
satisfactory one, has been a chieved by condoning the performance of 
some functions in other offices less qualified to produce Ordnance 
intelligence. Thus, the fields of mines and explosives are covered 
by the Intelligence Branch of the Engineer Corps. A similar situation 
exists in the Logistics Section. The NIS segment dealing with the 
armament industry is being produced elsevlhere, notwithstanding the fact 
that this section is best qualified to produce the Ie quired intelligence. 
A ITk.1intenance prograrll on Ordnan ce country studies cannot be instituted 
because of the higher priority assigned to the production of new countxy 
studies and the fulfillment of G-2 requests under the Army Intelligence 
Program. Moreover, fifteen countlY studies on areas of lesser 
~. n 
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S~CUi'i1:t ln~o.mation 
In spite,of tho 'personnel shortages; and the.sdveroo'eumar.or: 
working conditions in Pentagon Annex II, the Technical Intelligence 
Branch is continuously improving its production effort so far as quality 
and quantity is concerned. This has been made possible, by the 
selection of employees more than casually interested in their ,-lork J 
by the emphasis placed upon personnel training, and by the constant 
effort to devise better methods to accomplish the branch mission. 
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